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I. Introduction
The Canadian criminal justice system is facing serious criticism for being
racist.' Certain Canadian laws 2 and judicial decisions3 in the past have
made the legal system an easy target for such charges. Canadian
governments have acknowledged the problems of racism in Canadian
society4, and provincial and federal human rights legislation exemplify
efforts to eradicate racial discrimination.5 However, racial discrimination
persists in Canadian society and the criminal justice system occupies a
particularly sensitive place in controversies over the role of the state in
these problems.6 Moreover, the equality provisions in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms have quite properly raised expectations
that legislatures, courts and policy makers can and must use legal
mechanisms to counter racial discrimination wherever it exists, but
particularly in the criminal justice system.7
*Bruce P. Archibald, Professor of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax.
fThis paper was prepared for the conference "Sentencing now and in the Future" sponsored
by the Attorney General and Solicitor General of the Province of Nova Scotia, held on March
3 and 4, 1989 in Halifax, Canada.
1. For a discussion of what may be meant by a racially defined ethnic group, see E. Kallen,
Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada (1982), pp. 62-63.
2. For example, see the British Columbia Coal Mines Regulation Act, S.B.C. 1888, c.84, as
amended S.B.C. 1890, c.33 prohibiting employment of "Chinamen" which became the subject
of dispute in Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia Ltd v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 589 or the
Saskatchewan statute prohibiting the employment of white women by Chinese businessmen
which was upheld in Quong Wingv. The King (1914), 49 S.C.R. 440.
3. For example see Christie v. York Corp., [1940] S.C.R. 139 which upheld the "right" of a
tavern owner in Montreal to exclude black patrons; or Re Noble v. Wolfe, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 375
(Ont. C.A.) where the court upheld a trial decision confirming the right of a property owner
to place a covenant in a deed prohibiting sale to any person of the "Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic,
Negro or coloured race or blood" (overturned [1951] S.C.R. 64 on grounds not related to the
discriminatory nature of the covenant).
4. See Minister of State and Multiculturalism, Race Relations and the Law, Ministry of Supply
and Services, Ottawa, 1983 at pp. 11-20.
5. See the main Canadian text W. Tarmopolsky, Discrimination and the Law in Canada
(1982), passim.
6. Allegations of racism by police have recently emerged in Montreal and Toronto. The Royal
Commission on the Prosecution of Donald Marshall, Jr. has commissioned two studies on
racial discrimination in the justice system in the Province of Nova Scotia (one devoted to
blacks, the other to Micmacs) which will be published shortly.
7. See Raj Anand, "Ethnic Equality", in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, Equality Rights and the
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The purpose of this paper is to explore certain problems and solutions
regarding racial discrimination in the processes of sentencing and the
administration of criminal sanctions. In adopting this focus one must be
ever mindful that sentencing judges have no real choice in determining
which cases will come before them.8 Judges have virtually no control
over patterns of crime causation,9 nor are they able to greatly influence
the patterns of police behavior which will determine how police
resources are used to detect crime or apprehend suspects. 10 Thus, if
racism in society at large or in policing practices brings before the court
a disproportionate number of visible minority offenders," sentencing
judges cannot be "blamed." On the other hand, the criminal trial and the
process of sentencing in particular are a symbol and an embodiment of
the principles of justice (or injustice, as the case may be) in Canadian
society. As such, it is essential to ensure at the very least that the methods
by which offenders are sentenced and sanctioned do not promote or
exhibit characteristics of racial discrimination. Wherever possible in
accordance with principles of justice the sentencing and correctional
processes must also be actively directed toward the elimination of racial
discrimination. This paper is intended to assess how these two objectives
- egalitarian sentencing and ameliorative sentencing - can be achieved.
In order to do this, the evidence of racial discrimination in the
Canadian criminal justice system and the perceptions of racial bias in
sentencing must be examined. Next, it is essential to look at the disparate
purposes of the criminal sanction, the principles governing sentencing and
the range of sentencing options, to gain a sense of the limitations and the
potential of criminal sentencing in reducing racial discrimination. There
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Carswell, Toronto, 1985, pp. 81-130. Also: Rainer
Knopff, "Prohibiting Systemic Discrimination: Policy Development or Discontinuity?" (1985-
86), 50 Sask. L. Rev. 121; and Ian Savage, "Systemic Discrimination and Section 15 of the
Charter" (1985-86), 50 Sask. L. Rev. 141.
8. Some control by courts of abuse of their process is recognized. See for example R v. Jewitt
(1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 7 (S.C.C.). However, these cases will never amount to a wholesale
judicial assertion of the right to control the docket. Prosecutorial discretion will no doubt
continue to be a primary factor in the administration of criminal justice. See Bruce P.
Archibald, Prosecuting Officers and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nova Scotia
Research Study of the Royal Commission on the Prosecution of Donald Marshall Junior,
Halifax, forthcoming, passint Also Phillip C. Stenning, Appearing for the Crown. (Brown
Legal Pub., Cowansville, P.Q., 1986.)
9. The inconclusive nature of the effect of sentencing decisions on general deterrence is
discussed in ED. Cousineau, Legal Sanctions and Deterrence, a Research Report of the
Canadian Sentencing Commission, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1988.
10. Judicial decisions concerning allegations of police misconduct, whether in the context of
civil or criminal proceedings, might arguably have such an effect. However, such proceedings
are so rare that their impact is of no general concern here.
11. Evidence for the existence of such phenomena will be discussed below.
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subsequently follows an analysis of how choices can be made among
sentencing options in the interests of equality and affirmative action to
ensure justice for offenders from visible minorities which have historically
suffered from racial discrimination. Finally, the paper attempts to identify
tasks and allocate responsibilities for various players in the criminal
justice system with a view to reducing systemic discrimination via the
sentencing process. Given the enormous importance of the endeavour, it
is hoped that readers will pardon the presumptuousness of attempting
such a difficult undertaking in such brief compass.
II. Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System
Disputes over whether racial discrimination exists in the criminal justice
system, or the extent to which it exists, are often related to what is meant
by the term "discrimination". It is not merely, then, a pedantic exercise
to begin this section with a discussion of how discrimination has been
defined and how the concept has been applied recently by the Supreme
Court of Canada in relation to the equality guarantees of the Charter.
This section will then turn to the evidence available which demonstrates
systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system as a whole, before
considering the problems in any effort to scientifically demonstrate the
existence of racial discrimination in the sentencing patterns of the
judiciary. Conclusions are then drawn as to the problems which the
evidence poses in relation to sentencing policy and visible minorities.
1. Systemic Discrimination Defined
It is now widely accepted in Canada that racial discrimination is
understood to exist even where individuals involved in the discriminatory
behavior do not directly intend that their actions have an adverse effect
on the individuals or groups so harmed.12 This principle is the basis for
recognizing remedies against discrimination, in a variety of legal contexts,
which have been adopted recently by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Dickson, C.J. has stated:
"Discrimination ... means practices or attitudes that have, whether by
design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual or a group's right to
the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than
actual characteristics ... it is not a question of whether this discrimination
is motivated by an intentional desire to obstruct someone's potential, or
whether it is the by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems.
12. See Kallen, supra, footnote 1; Race Relations and the Law, supra, footnote 4; and
Tarnopolsky, supra, footnote 5. See also the Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in
Employment (The Abella Report), Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1984, pp. 7-10.
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If the barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative
way, it is a signal that the practices which led to this adverse impact may
be discriminatory."
13
This approach means that Canadian courts will increasingly be called
upon to determine whether discrimination exists based on evidence of
social patterns or legal practices demonstrating disproportionate "adverse
impacts" or "systemic discrimination" based on race where proof of
intentional bias is impossible. 1
4
This concept of adverse effects or systemic discrimination has been
used by the Supreme Court of Canada for the purpose of defining
equality rights in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 15 Charter section 15(1) provides, in part: "Every individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and benefit of the law without discrimination."' 6 In other words, section
15 of the Charter is designed to prevent and prohibit discriminatory
practices which purport to have the force of law.17 McIntyre, J., in a
passage which gained the approval of the whole court, interpreted the
meaning of the word discrimination in Charter section 15 in the
following manner:
".... discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional
or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations-
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association
13. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (known as the "action travail des femmes case") at pp. 1138 and 1139.
See also: Re Bhinder and C.N.R. Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561; Re Ontario Human Rights
Commission et aL and Simpson Sears Ltd (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.); Robichaud
etaL v. The Queen (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.).
14. For a full discussion see Beatrice Vizkelety, Proving Discrimination in Canada, Carswell,
Toronto, 1987,passim.
15. Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) c. 11,
proclaimed in force April 17, 1982, as amended by the Constitution Amendment
Proclamation, 1983, S.I./84-102, effective June 21, 1984; hereinafter cited simply as "the
Charter".
16. For helpful analyses of the meaning of this provision see: Anne F. Bayefsky, "Defining
Equality Rights", in Bayefsky and Eberts, supra, footnote 7, at p. 1, and A. Wayne MacKay,
"The Equality Provisions of the Charter and Education: A Structural Analysis", (1986) 11
Can. J. of Education 293. A more broad ranging series of articles on the potential impact of
section 15 can be found in Christine L.M. Boyle, A. Wayne MacKay, Edward J. McBride and
John A. Yogis, Chartenvatck Reflections on Equality, Carswell, Toronto, 1986, passim
17. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, reads: "The Constitution of Canada is the
supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution
is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."
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with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those
based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed."' 8
The sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code, 19 the common law
principles of sentencing, 20 and the decisions of sentencing judges2' make
no overt distinctions based on race or personal characteristics which are
explicitly attributed to accused persons on the basis of being a member of
a visible minority group. In this regard sentencing law or the sentencing
process can be described as "neutral on its face", or premised on notions
of "formal legal equality" among accused persons. It is the purpose of this
part of the paper to explore the extent to which the sentencing process is,
or is perceived to be, discriminatory in the sense of being characterized by
"adverse effects discrimination" or "systemic discrimination" in relation
to visible minorities.
2. The Problematic Evidence of Adverse Effects Discrimination in
Sentencing
The charge is often made that "equality before the law is a social
fiction."22 Indeed, the facts in Canada present some startling evidence to
this effect. It is a well documented fact that visible minorities are over
represented in Canadian prisons by comparison to their proportion in the
population as a whole.23 For example, aboriginal peoples form 2% of the
Canadian population, but 10% of the offenders in federal prisons.24
18. Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989], 1 S.C.R. 143, in which
provisions restricting admission to the legal profession in British Columbia to Canadian citizens
were struck down as contrary to Charter section 15. McIntyre, J. dissented as to the result, but
the other justices adopted his approach to the interpretation and application of Charter
section 15.
19. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, ss. 716-761, hereafter cited as "Criminal Code".
20. The difficulties caused by the absence of statutory principles of sentencing are discussed,
infra; in text corresponding to footnotes 44 to 50. For standard texts describing the common
law principles by which Canadian sentencing judges attempt to rationalize the exercise of their
broad sentencing discretion see R.P. Nadin-Davis, Sentencing in Canada, Carswell, Toronto,
1982; and Clayton C. Ruby, Sentencing; (3rd ed.), Butterworths, Toronto, 1987.
21. Intentional and express discrimination against any person on the basis of prohibited classes
of distinction would clearly be grounds for appeal. Moreover, such discrimination would
undoubtedly form the basis for complaint against that judge before the appropriate Judicial
Council, with the likely recommendation for dismissal. Since such overt discrimination is rare,
and carries particular remedies, this paper is primarily concerned with the more difficult
problems of unintended or covert systemic discrimination and its relationship to sentencing.
For certain rare "affirmative action" considerations by judges, see text and law cited, infra, at
footnote 161.
22. For example, see Thorsten Sellin, "Race Prejudice in the Administration of Justice"
(1935), 41 Am. J. Sociology 212 at p. 217.
23. See Knopff, supra; footnote 7; and Savage, supra, footnote 7.
24. Ole Instrup, Chairman, National Parole Board, "Chairman's Presentation to the Standing
Committee on Justice and the Solicitor-General", Ottawa, December, 1987 at p. 23. Statistics
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However, this disproportionate representation of visible minorities in
prison populations is not, in and of itself, evidence of racial
discrimination in sentencing. It is evidence of a pattern which may
demonstrate adverse effects discrimination in the criminal justice system
as a whole, or in the way in which that system applies to a racist society.
However, it is not evidence, per se, of racial bias in judicial decision
making.25 Reasons for this disproportionate number of visible minorities
in Canadian prisons may lie in differential crime rates across races,26
variations in deployment of police resources in relation to certain types of
crimes,27 discrimination in public reporting of crimes,28 discrimination in
police arrest practices, 29 discrimination in charging practices on the part
of Crown prosecutors, differential request rates for parole, 30 or
discrimination on the part of parole authorities, to name only some of the
logical possibilities.
Regardless of the fact that racial imbalances in prison populations may
be the result of systemic discrimination from many sources, the view is
widely held that there is racial discrimination in sentencing itself. The
well known criminologist Richard Quinney asserts:
"Obviously judicial decisions are not made uniformly. Decisions are made
according to a host of extra-legal factors, including the age of the offender,
his race and social class. Perhaps the most obvious example of judicial
discretion [sic] occurs in the handling of persons from minority groups.
provided to the author by the Solicitor-General of Nova Scotia indicate that Black offenders
make up approximately 7% of the Nova Scotian adult penal institution admissions, while
Aboriginal offenders are between 4 and 5 percent of prison admissions. Estimates place black
populations of major metropolitan areas in Nova Scotia at between 3% and 5%, of total
population while the aboriginal population (mostly Micmac) is less than 1% of the population
of Nova Scotia.
25. For a useful brief discussion of the relationship between possible discrimination in various
aspects of the criminal justice process and sentencing see Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen,
Susan E. Martin and Michael Tonry (eds.), Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform
National Academy Press, Washington, 1983, pp. 13-16.
26. There is evidence to suggest that for reasons related to special and economic discrimination
in society at large, blacks in the U.S. do commit certain crimes more frequently than whites.
See M.J. Hindelang, "Equality Under the Law", (1969) 60 J. of Crim. L., Criminology and
Police Sci 306-313.
27. For the classic Canadian discussions of the way in which deployment of police resources
"creates" crime, see Richard V. Ericson, Making Crime: A Study of Police Detective Work,
Butterworths, Toronto, 1981, passim" and R. Ericson, Reproducing Order. A Study of Police
Patrol WorkU. ofT Press, Toronto, 1982, passim.
28. The most recent study on public perception of crime was undertaken by the federal
government. See Solicitor General of Canada, Canadian Urban Victimization Survey, Bulletins
1-10, Ottawa, 1983-1988.
29. See R.M. Bienvenue and A.H. Latif, "Arrests, Disposition and Recidivism: A Comparison
of Indians and Non-Whites" (1974), 16 Can. J. Criminology and Corrections 105.
30. There is some Canadian evidence, for example, that native prisoners are less likely to make
application for early parole release than other inmates.
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Negroes, in comparison to whites, are convicted with lesser evidence and
sentenced to more severe punishments.
'31
Early social science studies of sentencing conducted in the United States
supported this view, 32 particularly in relation to the imposition of the
death penalty in the southern states.33 Indeed, recent American data
confirms that the renewed use of the death penalty falls with unequal
incidence on blacks and whites, especially when the race of the victim is
taken into account.
34
Despite these widely held impressions, the greater weight of the
modern sociological literature indicates that many of the earlier studies
were methodologically flawed, sometimes merely correlating race,
offence and sentencing outcomes. 35 The majority of modem studies
which take into account a series of variables, such as seriousness of the
offence, number of offences, degree of harm caused to a victim, use or
non-use of a weapon, employment status, prior criminal record,
dependence or alcohol or drugs, and so on, are finding that there is not
a statistically significant relationship between race of the accused per se
and sentencing outcome. Most studies state that evidence of racial
discrimination in sentencing is at most indirect or that sentencing
outcomes are predicted by legally relevant factors.36 The most
comprehensive American study concludes:
"The available research suggests that factors other than racial
discrimination in sentencing account for most of the disproportionate
representation of blacks in U.S. prisons, although racial discrimination
may play a more important role in some regions or jurisdictions, for some
crime types, or in the decisions of individual participants.
37
31. Richard Quinney, The SocialReality of Crime, (1970), pp. 141-142.
32. See for example: Thorsten Sellin, "The Negro Criminal: A Statistical Note" (1928), 140
Annals Am Academy of Pol. and Soc. Sci. 52.
33. E.H. Johnson, "Selective Factors in Capital Punishment" (1957), 36 Social Forces 165.
34. Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro, "Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization" (1984), 37 Stan. L. Rev. 27; and Anthony
G. Amsterdam, "Race and The Death Penalty" (1988), 7 Criminal Justice Ethics 2.
35. The most complete attempts to survey and assess the literature are: J. Hagen, "Extra-legal
Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of the Sociological Point of View" (1974),
8 Law and Soc. Rev. 357-383; G. Kleck, "Racial Discrimination in Sentencing: A Critical
Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty" (1981), 46 Amer.
Soc. Rev. 783-805; and J. Hagen and K. Bumimer, "Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review
and Critique of Sentencing Research," in Blumstein et al. Research on Sentencing; supra,
footnote 25, Vol. II, pp. 1-54.
36. For example, see Susan Welch, John Gruhl and Cassia Spohn, "Sentencing The Influence
of Alternative Measures of Prior Record" (1984), 22 Criminology 215-227.
37. Blumstein, et al. Research on Sentencing supra, footnote 25, Vol. 1, at p. 13. In agreement,
see Marjorie S. Zatz, "Race, Ethnicity and Determinate Sentencing" (1984), 22 Criminology
147-171.
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At least one Canadian statistical study supports such a conclusion, 38 and
it would not be surprising if the research undertaken by the Marshall
Inquiry disclosed the same results.
Statistical studies, of course, may mask the appearance of
discriminatory actions which have the effect of cancelling one another
out in the general results. For example, one U.S. study conducted in
Georgia found that "blacks are the victims of discrimination by some
judges, but the beneficiaries of discrimination by others. '39 Hence the
difficulty of relying on statistical data showing no systematic racial bias
in sentencing at the aggregate level. Furthermore, some "legally relevant"
factors in sentencing may have obviously discriminatory effects in
practice. For example, in considering whether an accused is an
appropriate candidate for a rehabilitative programme or a less punitive
sanctioning option, reference is often made to the accused's employment
status and employment record.40 Higher rates of unemployment among
visible minority groups under such circumstances will lead to disparate
sentencing results, but an analysis of comparative sentencing data will
ascribe the outcome to employment status and not racial discrimination
in sentencing.4t Some American jurisdictions have found the correlation
between employment status and race so potentially damaging to visible
minority groups that they have prohibited reference to employment
record in the sentencing process.42 This issue, of course, demonstrates
how a sentencing process which may be neutral and impartial on its face
can contribute to and perpetuate systemic discrimination which has its
roots in the social and economic systems of society at large.
3. A Sentencing Response to Perceived and Actual Systemic
Discrimination
At least one expert on sentencing research has decried the unwillingness
of researchers and the public to admit the fact that there is little evidence
38. Marek Debicki, "Sentencing and Socio-Economic Status," in Dale Gibson and Janet K.
Baldwin, Law in a Cynical Society? Opinion and Law in the 1980's, Carswell, Calgary, 1985,
pp. 219-235. For a British study with similar results see Michael McConville and John
Baldwin, "The Influence of Race on Sentencing in England", [1982] Crim. L. Rev. 652-658.
39. J.L. Gibson, "Race as a Determinant of Criminal Sentences: A Methodological Critique
and a Case Study" (1978), 12 Law and Soc. Rev. 455-478.
40. Standard Canadian sentencing texts assume that reference to employment status and
record will be made. See for example, Ruby, supra, footnote 20, p. 183.
41. For a recent review of the American literature on the topic see Bradford C. Mank, "The
Role of Employment Factors in Sentencing" (1988), Criminal Law Bulletin 249-253. Data on
Employment rates of visible minorities in Canada is found in The Abella Report, supra,
footnote 12, at pp. 79-99.
42. Minnesota has done so in its sentencing guidelines: Minn. Stat. Ann. 244.09 Comment
II.D.03(1) (West Supp. 1987); as has Congress in relation to the United States Sentencing
Commission: U.S.C.A. 994(d) and (e) (West Supp. 1987).
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of systematic racial discrimination in sentencing when research controls
for legally relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. 43 But there is a
widespread perception among members of visible minority groups, which
is unlikely to disappear, that judges are racially biased in the exercise of
their sentencing discretion. These perceptions may be accurate to the
extent that they are based on individual instances of racial discrimination
which are not caught through statistical studies. At the very least they
demonstrate that the sentencing process suffers from a credibility problem
- justice is not being seen to be done. More importantly sentencing
judges are caught in a legal system reinforcing a social and economic
order which draws visible minorities into its clutches in disproportionate
numbers. Using currently approved, legally relevant criteria, judges may
be forced to sentence disproportionate numbers of visible minority
offenders to prison in the name of formal equality.
There are thus two factual conclusions to be drawn which cry out to
be addressed in the sentencing process. First, there appears to be systemic
discrimination in the justice system as a whole, whether or not related to
sentencing, which has the effect of putting larger numbers of visible
minority offenders in prisons than their numbers in society at large would
warrant. Secondly, there is a widespread perception that there is racial
discrimination in sentencing itself, whether or not this is actually the case.
Before discussing how the sentencing process might address these
problems, it is necessary to assess critically the purposes, principles and
options which presently structure sentencing discretion in our criminal
justice system.
III. The Sentencing Process: Purposes, Principles and Options
Perceptions of racial discrimination in sentencing may in some measure
be a reflection of the public's general concern over sentencing disparity in
Canada. The Canadian sentencing Commission has collected data which
indicates that there is a widespread belief among both Crown and
defence counsel across Canada that unwarranted disparity in sentencing
exists. 44 Moreover, research into judicial attitudes45 and statistical
43. G. Kleck, "Life Support for Ailing Hypothesis: Modes of Summarizing the Evidence for
Racial Discrimination in Sentencing" (1985), 9 Law and Human Behavior 271-285. Kleck
argues that the class nature of the offender's crime has more to do with racially
disproportionate prison populations than raceperse.
44. The Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform A Canadian
Approach, Ministry of Supply and Services of Canada, Ottawa, 1987 states at p. 74: "...
approximately 93% of defence and 92% of Crown counsel were of the opinion that there was
at least some unwarranted variation in sentences in their own jurisdiction ... Forty percent of
defence counsel and 41% of Crown counsel thought that there was a "great deal of
unwarranted variation" in sentences handed down across Canada.
45. John Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process U. of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1971,
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analyses of sentencing practices in various parts of Canada46 support the
view that there are wide differences in outcomes in relation to essentially
similar cases. As Hogarth has indicated, some sentencing disparity may
be related to judicial differences as to the appropriate purposes of
principles which ought to govern the sentencing process 47 Thus judges
who think deterrence is the over-riding consideration in a particular case
seem more likely to hand down a harsher sentence than judges who
believe the interests of rehabilitating the offender ought to predominate.
This uncertainty concerning basic purposes and principles of sentencing,
when combined with the broad sentencing discretion given to judges
within the maximum allowable penalty for a given offence, has
implications for solving actual and perceived problems of racial
discrimination in sentencing.
If order is to be brought to the sentencing process, it is useful to
distinguish between the purposes of the criminal sanction and principles
of sentencing which govern the imposition of such sanctions. When this
distinction is clarified, the basis for choosing particular sentencing options
can be related to issues of equality and the particular problems faced by
visible minorities.
1. The Purposes of the Criminal Sanction
The litany of purposes of the criminal sanction is familiar to anyone
seriously involved with the criminal justice system. The over-arching
purpose of the criminal sanction is sometimes said to be the "protection
of the public". 48 As has been pointed out by others,49 this purpose is one
which is shared with other components of the criminal justice system
passim, and T.S. Palys and S. Divorski, "Judicial Decision-Making: An Examination of
Sentencing Disparity Among Canadian Provincial Court Judges", in D.C. Muller, P.E.
Blackmun, and A.J. Chapman (eds.), Psychology and the Law John Wiley and Sons, Toronto,
1984.
46. S.K. Jaffary, Sentencing ofAdults in Canada, U. ofT Press, Toronto, 1965; K.B. Jobson,
"Imprisonment" (1971) 4 Ottawa L. Rev. 421-457; L. MacDonald, "Crime and Punishment
in Canada: A Statistical Test of the Conventional Wisdon'" (1969), 6 Can. Rev. of Soc. and
Anthro 212-236. From government sources, see: Dept. of Justice of Canada, Sentencing,
Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1984; and Solicitor General of Canada, Long Term
Imprisonment in Canada, Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1984 as well as studies
cited in the Canadian Sentencing Commission Report supra, note 44, at p. 76 .
47. Hogarth, supra, footnote 45.
48. SeeR v. Grady (1971), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 264 (C.A.).
49. Andrew Ashworth, "Criminal Justice and Deserved Sentences", a paper presented to the
Conference of the Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law, "Reform of Sentencing Parole
and Early Release", August 1-4, 1988, Ottawa. Some, of course, would argue that the phrase
"protection of the public" has become more narrowly associated with the notion of
"incapacitation" discussed below. See Sentencing Commission Report, supra footnote 44, at
pp. 145-147.
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such as police forces or the correctional system. Thus it is not terribly
helpful as an analytical tool for the understanding of sentencing, although
it does emphasize the primarily public aspect of criminal law as opposed
to the predominantly private character of civil law which is directed to
compensation of losses suffered by persons (whether natural or juristic).50
(i) Retribution
The most important purpose of the criminal sanction in the eyes of most
members of the public and those of many jurists, and certainly a most
important effect of the criminal sanction from the perspective of most
offenders, is punishment or retribution.51 Retribution is the commonplace
notion justifying the imposition of the criminal sanction whereby it is said
that the person who chooses to break the law deserves to be punished.
52
The concept underpins the Criminal Records Act53 in so far as it is
understood that people who have served their sentence and "paid their
debt to society" merit having their record expunged if they have been of
good behavior for the requisite statutory period. Retribution, of course,
differs from vengeance in that it is a measured social response to the harm
done to society by the offender (the "eye for the eye" but no more) and
is not the mere infliction of limitless pain on a wrongdoer.5 4 During the
period from the early twentieth century until the 1960's, retribution was
down played. Described as backward looking and akin to vengeance,
retribution as a purpose of the criminal sanction gave way to the forward
looking, utilitarian goals meant to reduce crime, such as deterrence,
rehabilitation and incapacitation.55 Interestingly enough, the leading
50. This public/private distinction is often resorted to in describing criminal law in
introductory texts. See for example, Cross and Jones, Introduction to Criminal Law. (London,
Butterworths, 1980).
This emphasis on public protection and de-emphasis on compensation has become the focus
of criticism of victims rights groups, to be discussed below.
51. For a summary of classical notions of retribution see Nigel D. Walker, Punishment
Danger and Stigma, Blackwell, 1980.
52. It is this principle upon which we base our basic notions of fault or mens rea in general
criminal law theory. For a discussion of the fault notion and its constitutional importance
under the Charter, see Bruce P. Archibald, "The Constitutionalization of the General Part of
Criminal Law", (1988) 67 Can. Bar. Rev. 1.
53. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47.
54. The consideration of the place of the lex talionis in the history of western civilization is
beyond the scope of this paper! However, see Walker, supra, footnote 51, or Julius Stone,
Human Law andHuman Justice. (Stanford U. Press, Stanford, 1965), at p. 18.
55. The ascendancy of the utilitarian approach can be seen in the Report of the Royal
Commission to Investigate the Penal System of Canada (Archambault Report), Queen's
Printer, Ottawa, 1938; and the Report of a Committee Appointed to inquire into the Principles
and Procedures followed in the Remission Service of the Department of Justice of Canada (the
Fauteux Report), Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1956, which led to the establishment of the
national Parole Board in 1959. A good brief discussion of this "reductivism" is found in Eric
Colvin, Principles of CriminalLaw, Carswell, Toronto, 1986, pp. 19-24.
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Nova Scotian case on sentencing decided at the end of this period makes
no reference to retribution as one of the purposes of the criminal
sanctionP 6 However, more recent jurists and sentencing reformers have
returned to refurbished retributive principles under the label "just deserts"




Having broached the topic of utilitarian purposes for the criminal
sanction, a word is in order concerning deterrence. The deterrence
rationale for punishment has been prominent in western penological
thought since the eighteenth century,58 and is now understood to include
what are termed "general" and "particular" deterrence.59 An effective
general deterrent is said to be that degree of punishment which will
inhibit members of the general public from committing the offence in
question, while particular deterrence is that thought sufficient to prevent
the accused in question from re-offending. These amounts, of course, may
differ.60 Conventional wisdom is that general deterrence has differential
thresholds of success in relation to three categories of people: (a) those for
whom the mere existence of the law or the threat of a sanction is
sufficient to ensure compliance; (b) those determined individuals for
whom no level of threatened sanction will curb behaviour; and (c) that
group of rational would be criminals who will weigh the degree of
severity of the sanction against the benefit to be derived from the
commission of the crime.61 For the first category, general deterrence
amounts to social control through a "denunciation" of the conduct
56. R v. Grady, supra, footnote 48. See, however, the more comprehensive Nova Scotian
decision from the same era, R v. Fairn (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 423 (N.S. Co. Ct.). The
Supreme Court of Canada has had no difficulty in naming punishment as a purpose of the
criminal sanction: see Smith v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
57. The primary theorist of the new just deserts model is the American Andrew Von Hirsch.
See his influential Doing Justice" The Choice of Punishments, Hill and Wang, New York, 1976;
and his more recent Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing
of Criminals, Rutgers U. Press, New Brunswick, 1985. As to sentence reform, see Ken Pease
and Martin Wasik (eds.), Sentencing Reform: Guidance or Guidelines? Manchester U. Press,
Manchester, 1987; or the helpful summary of American sentencing reforms in the Canadian
Sentencing Commission Repor supr, footnote 44, at pp. 283-301.
58. The foundations of classical criminology were grounded in deterrent theory in 1764 with
Cesare Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments, translated by Henry Paolucci, Bobbs Merrill,
Indiapolis, 1963.
59. For a standard treatment see Ruby, Sentencing, supra, footnote 20, pp. 5- 10 .
60. For ajudicial treatment of this problem see R v. Fairn, supra, footnote 56.
61. This approach has been attractive to modem economists. See Gary S. Becker, "Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76 . of Pol. Economy 169-217. It is mentioned
in R v. Fairn, supra, footnote 56.
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declared by the state to be criminal and seems effective for a large but
indeterminate group of people. This purpose has been strongly advocated
by the Law Reform Commission of Canada.62 For the second category,
deterrence is of no value. For the third category, deterrence might work
in principle, but the theory of deterrence assumes a uniformity and
rationality of crime causation which is not supported by scientific
evidence. 63 Social science evidence on the effectiveness of deterrence is
inconclusive to say the least.64 Given the haphazard way in which the
news media report criminal sanctions to the general public, there is little
reason to think that raising the level of sentence in any particular case will
act as an effective general deterrent.65
(iii) Incapacitation
The second weapon in the utilitarian arsenal in the fight against crime is
incapacitation. This strategy relies primarily on the sanction of
incarceration, and is premised on the common sense proportion that
jailed offenders are by definition not capable of committing crimes
affecting society at large (although they may commit crimes in prison).
This purpose for the criminal sanction rests on the notion that the
offender being sentenced would commit further crimes if given a sanction
to be served at large in the community.66 The difficulty in its use is that
it relies upon the assumption that it is possible to predict dangerousness
or the certainty that an individual offender will recidivate. While many
are quite sanguine about the system's capacity to do this,67 the most
prevalent view is that in most cases we simply do not have the capacity
to predict the future behavior of individuals and the concomitant need for
incapacitation in most situations.6
8
62. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our CriminalLaw, Ministry of Supply and Services,
Ottawa, 1976.
63. For an excellent review of theories of crime causation see George B. Vold and Thomas J.
Bernard, Theoretical Criminology (3rd ed), Oxford U. Press, Toronto, 1986.
64. See Cousineau, Legal Sanctions and Deterrence, supra, footnote 9.
65. This is the conclusion in the Canadian Sentencing Commission Repor4 supra, footnote 44
at pp. 135-138.
66. See A. Blumstein, J. Cohen and D. Nagin (eds.) Deterrence and Incapacitation Estimating
the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates National Academy of Sciences, Washington,
1978, p. 9.
67. P. Greenwood, Selective Incapacitatiot; 1982. Also the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Lyons v. The Queen; [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.
68. A. Von Hirsch, "Selective Incapacitation Re-examined: The National Academy of
Sciences' Report on Criminal Careers and 'Career Criminals"' (1988) 7 Criminal Justice
Ethics 19; also C. Webster, B. Dickens and S. Addario, Constructing Dangerousness:
Scientific, Legal and Policy Implications. (Toronto: Center of Criminology, Univ. of Toronto,
1985.)
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(iv) Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a purpose for the criminal sanction which has emerged
from a recent, but mercifully brief eclipse. Depending upon one's strategy
this purpose is also known as reform or treatment. While the
rehabilitative ideal dominated penology in the early part of the twentieth
century, there was widespread disillusionment with rehabilitation in the
1960's and 1970's. 69 Indeterminate sentencing systems in many
American states were subjected to the scrutiny of comparative statistical
research. It was found that prisoners detained for the supposedly humane
purpose of rehabilitation or treatment were spending more time behind
bars on average than in states where the avowed purpose was punishment
for a relatively fixed period.70 Prisons were revealed not to improve
prisoners, but to be schools for crime.71 Moreover, the title to a famous
publication became twisted into slogan by which to bludgeon the
rehabilitative ideal: "Nothing works", it was said.72 Correctional officials
excised the language of "rehabilitation" and "treatment" from their
vocabularies, and strove instead to achieve the more limited goal of "re-
integration" of offenders at the end of periods of incarceration through
providing "opportunities for self-improvement" to willing offenders. 73
However, persistent research and action by those committed to the goal
of rehabilitation has demonstrated that, while many rehabilitative
programmes have failed in the past because they were poorly thought out
or inadequately implemented, rehabilitation and treatment can work.
Certain strategies for carefully selected offenders when properly carried
out yield significantly positive results. 74 Rehabilitation or treatment as
purposes for the criminal sanction are alive and well, though tamed.
(v) Compensation and Victim/Offender Reconciliation
A final purpose for the criminal sanction, which in the minds of many is
69. Francis Allen, "Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal," (1959),
50 J. of Crim. L., Criminology and Police Sci 226-232; and Francis Allen, The Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideak PenalPolicy and SocialPurpose, Yale U. Press, New Haven, 1981.
70. American Friends Service Committee Working Party, Struggle for Justice: A Report on
Crime and Punishment in America, Wang and Hill, New York, 1971.
71. L. Sechrest, S. White and E. Brown (eds.) The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 1979; D. Lipton, R. Martinson and J. Wilks, The
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies, Praeger,
New York, 1975.
72. R. Martinson, "What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform" (1974), 35
The Public Interest 22-54.
73. See Correctional Law Review, Working Paper No. 1, Correctional Philosophy, Ministry
of the Solicitor General, Ottawa, 1986.
74. Paul Gendreau and Robert R. Ross, "The Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence from
the 1980's" (1987), 4 Justice Quarterly 349; and Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert,
ReaffirmingRehabilitation. Anderson Publishing, Cincinnati, 1982.
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linked to rehabilitation, has emerged from the margins of criminal law
doctrine to a prominent place much closer to the centre. This is the
matter of compensation and restitution to victims of crime. In the 1970's
and 1980's the victims rights movement conducted a successful crusade
against the state-centred image of criminal justice which treated victims
as mere witnesses in the process and relegated reparation primarily to the
civil sphere through tort law.75 While some critics have pointed to the
spectre of victims perverting the criminal justice system in a private quest
for vengeance, 76 the renewed place of the victim in the criminal code is
assured through improved mechanisms for compensation, 77 as well as
victim impact statements.7 The link to rehabilitation is achieved through
victim/offender reconciliation schemes which are now being run in many
Canadian jurisdictions. 79 Though largely restricted to non-violent
offences,80 these programmes are designed not only to meet the needs of
the victim, but to ensure that the offender comes to terms with his or her
responsibility for anti-social conduct as a crucial step in a rehabilitative
strategy.81
The foregoing truncated catalogue of the purposes of the criminal
sanction has intentionally avoided discussion of how these purposes are
related to the task of the sentencing judge. The reason for this is to
highlight the distinction which ought to be made between these purposes
of the criminal sanction and the principles which should govern
sentencing. Purposes of the sanction and sentencing principles are closely
related, but not identical, as the next section will attempt to demonstrate.
2. Principles for Determining Severity of a Sentence
The "just deserts" proponents demonstrate convincingly that the
traditional utilitarian purposes for the criminal sanction provide no
adequate basis for determining the relative severity of the sentence which
75. I. Waller, The Role of the Victim in Sentencing and Related Processes, Dept. of Justice,
Ottawa.
76. For example, see [1940] 3 D.L.R. 606 (Que. K.B., App. Side).
77. Criminal Code, s.725. Note there are extensive unproclaimed amendments enlarging this
provision via Stats. Can. 1988, c.30, s.6.
78. Ibid., s.7.
79. See John Eckstedt and Margaret Jackson, A Profile of Canadian Alternative Sentencing
Programmes: A National Review of Policy Issues, Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1988.
80. But see the "Genesee Justice" programme which seems successful in reconciling victims
and offenders even in serious crimes of violence. Brochures available from the Community
Service/Victim Assistance Programme, Genesee County Sheriffs Department, County
Building #1, Batavia, N.Y, USA 14020-3199.
81. This approach was greeted with enthusiasm in the Sixth Report of the Standing
Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (The Daubney Committee), Taking
Responsibility, House of Commons, Ottawa, 1988, pp. 9 7-9 8.
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ought to be meted out to a particular offender.82 The interests of general
deterrence may justify the imposition of a far harsher penalty than the
gravity of the offence or the degree of the offender's culpability would
otherwise warrant.83 Similarly, if an offender needs rehabilitation in order
to enable him or her to conform to the dictates of lawfulness in society,
the period of time requried to accomplish such a complex task may be far
longer than that of any period of incarceration or control forced upon the
offender under a just deserts scheme.84 Conversely, is it self evident that
where two accused have jointly committed a criminal offence, the one
who has found a job and has good rehabilitative prospects should receive
a lesser penalty than his or her colleague who languishes on
unemployment insurance? Finally, the potential injustice in an
incapacitative purpose as the determinant of sentencing severity is
manifest in a system where there is no assurance that our capacity to
predict dangerousness has any substantial degree of accuracy. This is not
to say that the utilitarian purposes for the criminal sanction have no
importance for the choosing of sentencing options or the methods of
imposing sanctions. Rather, it points to the fact that these purposes do not
provide an adequate principle of determining the severity of the sentence.
(i) Proportionality, Equality and Restraint
Justice requires that proportionality, restraint and equality be the primary
determinants of the severity of a sentence. Recent Canadian proposals for
reform all recognize this reality.85 The principle of proportionality, from
which the corollary principles of restraint and equality are derived, has
most usefully been stated thus:
"The paramount principle governing the determination of a sentence is
that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the
degree of responsibility of the offender for the offence."
86
This principle requires the court to consider aggravating and mitigating
82. In particular, see Von Hirsch, supra, footnote 57.
83. This, of course, was the gravamen of the charges laid against indeterminate sentencing
systems in the United States. See Allen, supra, footnote 69.
84. Canadian courts of appeal leave open the possibility of sacrificing an offender for the
general good in this fashion. See R v. McKimm, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 340 (Ont. C.A.).
85. This was the case with the Criminal Law Reform Act, 1984, (Bill C-19) derived from
work by the Law Reform Commission of Canada which died on the order paper. It is found
in the "Declaration of Purpose and Principles of Sentencing" of the Canadian Sentencing
Commission Repor4 supra, footnote 44, at pp. 153-155; and it was adopted in the Report of
the Daubney Committee, supra, footnote 81, pp. 246-247.
86. Bill C-19, supra, footnote 85, in proposed Criminal Code section 645(3)(a); Sentencing
Commission Declaration of Purpose and Principles, supra, footnote 85, section 4(c); and
Daubney Committee Report, supra, footnote 81 recommendation 9, p. 248.
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circumstances relating to the seriousness of the crime,87 and the accused's
degree of culpability.88 The principle of restraint is variously described as
requiring that "a sentence should be the least onerous sanction
appropriate in the circumstances",8 9 that "the maximum penalty
prescribed for an offence should be imposed only in the most serious
circumstances", 90 and that "the nature and combined duration of the
sentence and any other sentence imposed upon the offender should not be
excessive".91 The principle of equality must be asserted in determining
severity of sentence in order to minimize disparity flowing from the
sentencing process. A sentence must "be consistent with sentences
imposed on other offenders for similar offences committed in similar
circumstances."
92
The principle of proportionality or just desert appears to be receiving
the imprimature of the Supreme Court of Canada as a matter of
constitutional doctrine.93 In striking down penal laws invoking the
combination of absolute liability and imprisonment,94 conviction for
murder without requiring proof of fault,95 and automatic minimum
penalties with no regard to the gravity of the offence or degree of
culpability of the offender,96 the court has repeatedly invoked the
principle of proportionality. This approach by the court seems rooted in
its apparent acceptance of the fact that "punishment" is an inevitable
aspect of our criminal law.97 Moreover, it is consistent with public views
87. Both the Canadian Sentencing Commission and the Daubney Committee, supra, footnote
85, have proposed specific tests of aggravating and mitigating factors drawn from judicial
experience; such as use of violence, cruelty to a victim, evidence of organized criminal activity,
breach of trust, etc.
88. Degree of culpability might include such standard factors as the existence or absence of
previous convictions, physical or mental impairment, the age of the offender, or the offender's
role in the offence. The issue of race will be addressed subsequently.
89. Both the Canadian Sentencing Commission and the Daubney Committee, supra, footnote
85, have proposed specific tests of aggravating and mitigating factors drawn from judicial
experience; such as use of violence, cruelty to a victim, evidence of organized criminal activity,
breach of trust, etc.
90. Canadian Sentencing Commission Declaration, section 4(b); Daubney Committee,
recommendation 6(b).
91. Canadian Sentencing Commission Declaration, section 4(c)(iii); and Daubney
Committee, recommendation 6(c).
92. Canadian Sentencing Commission Declaration, section 4(c)(iii); Daubney Committee,
recommendation 6(a).
93. See Bruce P. Archibald, "Crime and Punishment: The Constitutional Requirements for
Sentencing Reform in Canada", (1988), 22 Revuejuridique thrmis 307.
94. Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
95. Vaillancourtv. The Queen (1987), 81 N.R. 115 (S.C.C.).
96. Smith v. The Queen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
97. The word "punishment" is used by Wilson, J. in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference case,
supra, footnote 94 at pp. 533-534, as does Lamer, J. in Vaillancourt, supra, footnote 95, at pp.
131-132, although in association with the words "stigma" and "penalty".
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of the purpose of the criminal sanction and the sentencing reform
proposals described above.
In this context, the utilitarian approach of some Canadian courts of
appeal is potentially contrary to the principle of proportionality, and thus
constitutionally suspect. For example, in the Grady case, the Nova Scotia
Appeal Division finds that the primary purpose of sentencing is the
protection of the public, and that this aim is to be achieved through (a)
deterrence (general or particular) or (b) reform and rehabilitation or a
combination of (a) and (b).98 As a principle for determining the severity
of the criminal sanction this approach is inadequate. It ignores the
principles of proportionality, restraint and equality, and as such may be
thought a possible basis for depriving someone of their liberty other than
in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.99 Of course Nova
Scotian courts in reality ignore the Grady decision. After an abstract
recital of the famous passage from Grady, sentencing courts look to the
appropriate guideline judgment from the Court of Appeal for the type of
offence in question,100 and then consider the various aggravating and
mitigating factors arising from the evidence. In other words, they consider
the principle of proportionality as they should. The difficulty, however, is
that where general deterrence is over-emphasized restraint may be
sacrificed, and where the rehabilitative potential of the offender is over-
emphasized equality may be sacrificed. The Grady decision reinforces
this dichotomy between deterrence and rehabilitation which has been
shown to be a primary source of sentencing disparity. 101
(ii) Limiting Retributivism or Hybrid Sentencing Principles
The reconciliation of proportional sentencing principles with utilitarian
purposes of the criminal sanction is possible. Often this reconciliation is
identified by the designation "limiting retributivism", 102 although the
Canadian Sentencing Commission and the Daubney Committee
proposals both attempt to introduce variants of this kind of solution
without using the label. The fundamental basis for the compromise is that
principles of proportionality or just desert are primary in determining the
98. Grady, supra, footnote 48.
99. This, of course, is the constitutional standard of Charter section 7.
100. The guideline judgment in robbery matters, for example, is two to six years, six to ten for
robberies committed in financial institutions or private dwellings. See R. v. Leet (1989), 88
N.S.R. (2d) 161 (C.A.).
101. This is the problem research by Hogarth, supra, footnote 45, and Polys and Divorski,
supra, footnote 45.
102. This phrase is used by Nigel Walker, supra, footnote 51; and is approved in Andrew
Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy. (George Weindenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., London,
1983). See also Norvell Morris, Madness and the CriminalLaiv. (Chicago: Univ. of Chi, 1982.)
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severity of the sanction, however, within these outer limits, utilitarian
purposes, particularly rehabilitation and victim offender reconciliation,
ought to be given full scope for implementation. Thus the Canadian
Sentencing Commission proposes that within the confines of sentencing
options determined by proportionality, restraint and equality, "the court
may give consideration to any one or more" of the following:
103
"(a) denouncing blameworthy behavior;
(b) deterring the offender and other persons from committing
offences;
(c) separating offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) providing for redress for the harm done to individual victims or
to the community;
(e) promoting a sense of responsibility on the part of offenders and
providing for opportunities to assist in the rehabilitation as
productive and law-abiding members of society."
Some writers recognize that in such a hybrid system, proportionality may
sometimes have to give way to pressing utilitarian concerns: 4 However,
the main difficulty in implementing such an approach is to set out a range
of sentencing options capable of achieving the utilitarian purposes which
can be evaluated against one another in accordance with the principles of
just desert. These matters are canvassed in the next section.
3. Proportionate Sentencing Options
The sentencing options available to Canadian criminal courts, in formal
terms, are imprisonment, 0 5 fine,' 0 6 fine options, 0 7 suspended
sentences, 08 probation orders, 0 9 compensation orders,110 and conditional
and absolute discharges."' While this might seem a limited range of
alternatives, they can be applied in such a manner as to provide a good
deal of flexibility to the court in seeking to achieve one or more of the
purposes of the criminal sanction discussed earlier. The way in which the
Criminal Code is drafted, however, has tended to reinforce the notion
that imprisonment is the "normal" sanction and that all others are
103. Canadian Sentencing Commission, Declaration, section 4(d).
104. Paul H. Robinson, "Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions",
(1988) 82 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 19.
105. Criminal Code, ss.717, 730-734.
106. Criminal Code, s.718, 719.
107. Criminal Code, s.718.1.
108. Criminal Code, s.737.
109. Criminal Code, s.737.
110. Criminal Code, ss.725 and 726.
111. Criminal Code, s.736.
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"lesser" alternatives." 2 Harkening back to the Grady principles of
sentencing, this has meant in practice that when a court sees deterrence
as the primary applicable goal in the circumstances it imposes a term of
imprisonment; when the goal is rehabilitation a non-carceral sanction is
imposed."3 Indeed, Canadian sentencing reformers have been quite
adamant that "a term of imprisonment should not be imposed, nor its
duration determined, solely for the purpose of rehabilitation"., 4 While
this view is sound, in that prisons have been found not to be rehabilitative
environments, it has reinforced the view that non-carceral sentences are
not really punishment. This view can even be inferred from much work
done in the field of sentencing reform where sophisticated sentencing
guidelines have been developed to adjust length of prison sentences to
principles of just desert while leaving non-carceral sanctions in the
unstructured discretion of the courts." 5 But some non-carceral sanctions
are clearly more punitive or restrictive of an offender's liberty than others,
and an attempt must be made to work out equivalencies. Moreover, as
the principle of restraint and the dictates of financial constraints on
governments conspire to put emphasis on non-carceral sanctions, their
place in the proportional or just deserts scheme of things will have to be
worked out with considerable care.
(i) Rating the Relative Severity of Community Sanctions
The first step in this process must be to work out the relative levels of
severity among the sanctions or sentencing options available to the
courts. It may be helpful to look briefly at incarceration prior to
examining the more difficult issues in rating severity of community
sanctions. The initial response on the imprisonment side is to say the
system is capable of making quantitative judgments only and not
qualitative ones. We know that spending 90 days in jail is worse than
spending 10 days in jail, but we are unable to determine (at least
formally) whether spending 18 months in the Halifax Correctional
Centre is worse than 2 years in Springhill Institution or vice versa.
112. Criminal Code, s.718 indicates that fines are "in lieu of any other punishment" or "in lieu
of imprisonment".
113. This is the phenomenon described in Hogarth, supra, footnote 45, as well as R. Paul
Nadin-Davis, Sentencing in Canada (Carswell, Ottawa, 1982).
114. See Canadian Sentencing Commission Declaration, section 4(c)(iv), or the Daubney
Committee Report, recommendation 6(d) and 6(e).
115. While the Canadian Sentencing Commission has put more emphasis on what it called
"community sanction" than most of its analogues in other jurisdictions, the Commission
acknowledges the limitations of its work, and proposes that the task of rationalizing
community sanctions be undertaken by a permanent sentencing commission. See Canadian
Sentencing Commission Report, pp. 372 and 373.
Sentencing and Visible Minorities
Similarly, it would depend on an offender's individual circumstances
whether serving thirty days consecutive time is more harsh than spending
30 days in jail intermittently served on weekends and holidays. Given
these difficulties, the system may have to be content with assuming that
a day in jail is a day in jail for calculating relative proportionality,
although it would clearly be in accordance with the principle of restraint
to take into account the offender's preferences where feasible. It seems
that sentencing guideline systems whether of statutory or judicial origins
have nowhere attempted to make explicit qualitative judgments about
time served in different institutions."16
If calculating severity and proportionality in relation to prison terms is
not without its difficulties, non-carceral sentences or community
sanctions pose greater problems by virtue of their diversity. But a rational
approach to the retributive as well as rehabilitative or reconciliatory
nature of community sanctions is key to having community sanctions
accepted as sentences in their own right - not just alternatives to the so-
called real penalty of imprisonment. If community sanctions are to be
imposed in a manner consistent with principles of proportionality,
equality and restraint, the system must have a way to evaluate their
relative retributive weight. What is required is a table of equivalencies for
community sanctions.
In order to enforce the possibility of creating a table of equivalencies
for community sanctions, it is necessary to describe the available
alternative community sanctions in more concrete terms. A recent study
of alternative sentencing programmes in Canada lists the major options as
fine options, community service orders, restitution programmes, victim-
offender reconciliation programmes and attendance programmes."17 The
Canadian Sentencing Commission also considers fines and probation as
falling under the rubric of community sanctions, since they are non-
carceral even though they are not so "innovative"."' Community service
orders, victim/offender reconciliation programmes and the various
116. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the impact of the parole system on the
manner in which one calculates the severity of imprisonment. The Canadian Sentencing
Commission Report canvasses this problem in considerable detail under the heading "the
meaning of a sentence of imprisonment" and concludes that full parole release ought to be
abolished as being in conflict with the principle of proportionality, pp. 233-267. The Daubney
Committee did not recommend abolition of parole, but proposes that the eligibility period for
full parole release be increased from one third to one half of the period of imprisonment. See
its recommendation 47.
117. John Ekstedt and Margaret Jackson, A Profile of Canadian Sentencing Programmes: A
National Review of Policy Issues, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1988, and also their Alternatives
to Incarceration/Sentencing Option Programmes: What are the Alternatives, Dept. of Justice,
Ottawa, 1988. Both are research papers conducted for the Canadian Sentencing Commission.
118. Canadian Sentencing Commission Report, pp. 353-4, 374-388.
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attendance programmes are not sentences in their own right, but are
imposed in the discretion of the court by means of conditions in
probation orders119 and conditional discharge orders. 120 This secondary
status is thought to have limited their attractiveness and credibility as
sentencing alternatives in the eyes of many judges.121
Fines are clearly a punitive measure usually imposed with a view to
deterrence, but with virtually no rehabilitative characteristics. It is said
that in Canada "over 90% of convictions in summary conviction matters
and up to one third of convictions in indictable offences result in the
imposition of fines.122 Unlike some countries Canada gives very little
statutory guidance as to how heavy a fine to impose in relation to
particular offences committed in particular circumstances.' 3 Canada has
a system of "global fines" which notionally suggest that a particular
offence in certain circumstances is worth "X dollars". The tariff ranges
within statutory maxims are the product of individual judicial decisions,
informal judicial consultation, use of precedent and minimal guidance
form courts of appeal. Setting the amount of the fine in terms of the
accused's ability to pay has been formally rejected by courts of appeal on
the grounds of "equality before the law". 24 Reformers have consistently
argued that a system of "day fines" be adopted as in many other
countries 125 whereby an offender would be fined "x days' income". 26 By
abandoning formal legal equality in favour of a system which would
distribute deterrent penalties in accordance with calculable economic
differences among offenders, such a system, if widely adopted in
Canada, 27 would break certain conceptual barriers and taboos about
119. Criminal Code, 2.737. Restitution requirements may also be included in probation
orders.
120. Criminal Code, s.736.
121. Canadian Sentencing Commission Report, pp. 347-349.
122. Simon Verdun-Jones and Teresa Mitchell-Banks, The Fine as a Sentencing Option in
Canada, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1988.
123. See Calvert R. Dodge, A World Without Prisons: Alternatives to Incarceration
throughout the World, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1979.
124. P. v. Natrall (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (B.C.C.A.), R v. Johnson (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d)
541 (N.S.C.A.); R v. Johnson and Tremayne, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 64 (Ont. C.A.); and R v. Carroll
(1980), 27 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 159 (P.E.I.C.A.).
125. Day fine systems, first introduced in Finland, are now operative in Sweden, Denmark,
Peru, Costa Rica, Bolivia, West Germany and Australia. See Verdun-Jones and Mitchell-
Banks, supra, footnote 121 at p. 42.
126. For a description of one of the most successful systems, see Hans Thornstedt, "The Day
Fine System in Sweden" [1975] Crim. L. Rev. 307-312.
127. The Canadian Sentencing Commission Report, p. 378 recommends use of a day fine
system pursuant to study by a permanent sentencing commission and advocates pilot projects
in the province. For similar recommendations see: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Guidelines, Dispositions and Sentences in the Criminal Process, Ministry of Supply and
Services, Ottawa, 1977.
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punishment having to be "neutral on its face". But whether one fines in
global dollars or day fine units, the notional application of the principles
of proportionality, restraint and equality can be worked out quite
systematically - the more serious the offence the higher the fine and
vice-versa.
Probation orders may be imposed in conjunction with conditional
discharges, suspended sentences, fines, or imprisonment on an
intermittent basis or straight time of less than 2 years. 128 Being both
ancillary to other measures and of such flexibility, it is difficult to evaluate
the probation order per se in terms of just desert. Standard conditions in
probation orders include reporting regularly to probation officers,
providing support to dependents, abstaining from use of alcohol,
prohibition of ownership or possession of a weapon, restitution to
victims, remaining within the jurisdiction, and making reasonable efforts
to find suitable employment. 129 Probation orders are thus measures of
social control with a re-integrative, if not rehabilitative, twist. A
probation period is limited to a maximum of three years, and as such is
at the lower end of the punitive scale. 30 On the other hand, there is no
doubt that the offender's liberty is being curtailed and the recipient is
suffering retribution for the offence committed even if rehabilitative
measures are in the minds of the judge or the probation staff.' 3' Thus a
probation order connected with a suspended sentence or conditional
discharge, even with the least onerous standard conditions, can be rated
on a "table of equivalencies" ordered in accordance with proportionality,
equality and restraint. Probation orders are not simply non-entities from
the retributive perspective. The point here, however, is that probation
orders can be rated according to limiting retributivist principles of
sentencing while being directed to utilitarian purposes of the criminal
sanction within those limitations.
Community service orders are non-custodial dispositions whereby the
offender serves his sentence by performing a number of hours of work in
non-profit community projects as designated by the court. Community
service orders emerged in the late 1970's and 1980's132 as a result of
128. Criminal Code, sections 736 and 737.
129. These are the conditions listed in Criminal Code section 736.
130. Criminal Code, section 738(2).
131. It is said that the current ratio of offenders on probation in Nova Scotia in relation to
those in custody is approximately 10:1 - the highest in Canada. Nova Scotia Department of
the Solicitor General, Correctional Services - Department of Solicitor General - Overview,
unpublished departmental manuscript, 1988.
132. An extensive bibliography of Canadian government documents describing the use of
community service orders is found in Ekstedt and Jackson, A Profile of Canadian Alternative
Sentencing Programmes: A National Review of Policy Isses, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1988 at
pp. 223-225.
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judicial creativity in the interpretation of the Criminal Code provision
authorizing as the term of a probation order "... such other reasonable
conditions as the Court considers desirable for securing the good conduct
of the accused and for preventing a repetition by him of the same offence
or the commission of other offences". 33 The purposes of the community
service order include punishment, reparation and rehabilitation. 34 Their
popularity of late, however, is in no small measure due to the fact that
they potentially alleviate jail over-crowding 35 and are a means by which
to reduce the costs of corrections. 136 From a rehabilitative point of view
community service orders allow for redevelopment of improved work
habits, acquisition of new skills and the cultivation of helpful contacts in
the general community. This is accomplished in a manner which avoids
the negative aspects of institutionalization from prison culture. 137 In
addition, the offender may creatively "pay the debt" he or she owes to
society - with attendant material benefit to the community and possible
psychological benefit to the offender. 138- From the retributive angle the
accused is penalized through restrictions on his or her liberty and the
requirement to contribute his or her efforts to the community project.
Most importantly for our discussions here, hours of community service
are quantifiable. While there may be qualitative differences between
various community projects, the yardstick of hours of service can be used
in calculating proportionality, equality and restraint in relation to other
forms of sanction.
In so far as calculating "just deserts" are concerned, victim/offender
reconciliation programmes can be perceived as specialized forms of
community service orders with particular correctional goals. Proponents
of such programmes argue strongly that they humanize the criminal
justice system, are effective in rehabilitating certain classes of offenders,
133. This use of Criminal Code section 737(2)(h) received court of appeal approved in R v.
Shaw andBrehn (1977), 36 C.R.N.S. 358 (Ont. C.A.) inter alia
134. For a succinct discussion of these purposes, see Ekstedt and Jackson, supra, footnote 132
at pp. 23-26, as well as their subsequent descriptions of programmes in all Canadian provinces
where they are operative.
135. The Canadian Sentencing Commission Report pp. 367-371 cautions about the problem
known in the literature as the "widening of the net" whereby community sanctions are used
not to reduce imprisonment but rather to impose more onerous sanctions on persons who
might otherwise receive less intrusive conditions in probation orders.
136. It has been estimated that for Ontario in 1979 imprisonment of an offender cost $50 per
day while supervision via a community service order cost only $2.35: Ekstedt and Jackson,
ibid, at p. 25, citing M.L. Polanoski, The Community Service Programme in Ontario: A
Description of the Initial Cases, Ministry of Correctional Services, Toronto, 1979.
137. On the devastating effects of prison culture in general see L.H. Bowler, Prison Societies
and Corrections: The Science and the Art, MacMillan, Toronto, 1982. For description closer
to home, read Michael Harris, Justice Denied- The Law versus Donald Marshall MacMillan,
Toronto, 1986,passim
138. For a discussion of this side, see
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provide reparation to victims, and improve the criminal justice system in
the eyes of victims and the general public.139 From a retributive point of
view they constrain the offender's freedom, and impose losses in terms of
time which can be computed in the same manner as hours of community
service. Depending upon how positively the system evaluated the goal of
victim/offender reconciliation, a premium or bonus might be added in
relation to "time served" in this way.
(ii) The Fine Option Programme and Conversion Tables
Lest it be thought that the exercise of creating equivalents between
sanctions is an unattainable goal which can only be advocated for some
upcoming utopia, let us recall that the future is now partly with us in the
form of the fine option. Criminal Code section 718.1 creates the
possibility for an offender who has been fined to "discharge the fine in
whole or in part by earning credits for work performed during a period
not greater than two years in a program established for that purpose...".
Such programmes have been set up in a number of Canadian provinces,
following the lead of Saskatchewan in 1975.140 The recent case of Hebb
v. The Queen in Nova Scotia' 41 gives a constitutional push for the
creation of fine option programmes in those provinces which have not yet
established them. The Criminal Code also states that these programmes
"... shall determine the rate at which credits are earned and may provide
for the manner of crediting any amounts earned against the fine and any
other matters necessary for or incidental to carrying out the program."'142
In other words, programmes must work out on principles of
proportionality, equality and restraint according to a table of equivalents
for converting fine amounts into hours of community service and vice
versa. 143 This is currently being done in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatche-
wan, Alberta and the Northwest Territories. 144
139. The Daubney Committee Report is most enthusiastic about victim/offender
reconciliation programmes, at pp. 90-97. For a description of Canadian programmes see
Ekstedt and Jackson, supra, footnote 132, p. 30-32.
140. For a description of Canadian programmes see Ekstedt and Jackson, supra, footnote 132
p. 20-23. passim.
141. Supreme court of Nova Scotia, per Kelly, J., in R. v. Hebb (1989), 89 NSR(2d) 137
(S.C.) wherein the court struck down those words in Criminal Code section 718(10) which
directed courts to consider ability to pay prior to imposing imprisonment in default of the
payment only in cases where the accused was between 16 and 21 years of age. The court held
this must now be done in all cases.
142. Criminal Code, section 718.1(2).
143. Criminal Code section 722 authorizes reduction of imprisonment for part payment, while
section 718.1 gives the fine option to an offender ... "whether or not the offender is serving
a term of imprisonment imposed in default of payment of the fine".
144. John Ekstedt and Margaret Jackson, Alternatives to Incarceration/Sentencing Option
Programmes: What are the Alternatives, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1988, pp. 54-55.
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It is a short step from a conversion table for fine amounts and
community service hours, to a table which would include time served in
prison as well. In fact this step is implicit in the Criminal Code which
now allows proportionate reduction of time served in default of fine
payment through part payment of the fine or by community service in a
fine option programmes. 145 In fact, Ekstedt and Jackson assert:
"There is an informal set of standardized equivalences between monies
paid, community hours worked and time spent in jail in Saskatchewan,
according to the [Saskatchewan] Corrections Branch, although few knew
of it or whether it is used by the courts. The Corrections Branch also
suggested that some of the judiciary were reluctant to accept such a request
for equivalencies from Corrections as they were concerned about being
influenced by a government department."
146
These same Canadian provinces are close to attaining a "standard
sanction unit" of sentence severity by which to equate time served in jail,
time served in community sanctions and fine amounts. 47 Canada seems
further advanced than many other jurisdictions in this regard, although
there are many problems yet to resolve.
48
It ought to be stressed here that a conversion table, or table of
equivalences, is in no way counter to the accused's right to individualized
justice.1 49 Judicial discretion to assess the degree of seriousness of the
offence and the degree of the accused's culpability including all
aggravating and mitigating factors is left intact.5 0 In such a system,
judicial discretion is not fettered, but its meaning is explained in terms of
its effect in relation to other sentencing options. It is important however
that judicial input be obtained in the creation of the conversion tables so
145. For a conceptual approach to this issue see Martin Wasik and Andrew von Hirsch,
"Non-Custodial Penalties and the Principles of Desert" [1988] Crim. L.R. 555.
146. Supra, footnote 144.
147. Supra, footnote 145.
148. Not the least of which is how to gauge appropriate levels of severity and weight the
different sanctions in relation to one another. Some empirical work has been done on seeking
public perceptions on these issues. See L. Sebba, "Some Explorations in the Scaling of
Penalties" (1978), 15 J. of Research in Crime and Delinquency 247; L. Sebba and G. Nathan,
"Further Explorations in the Scaling of Penalties" (1984), 24 Brit. J. Criminology 221; A.
Kapardis and D. Farrington, "An Experimental Study of Sentencing by Magistrates" (1981),
5 Law and Human Behavior 107; and N. Walker and C. Marsh, "Do Sentences Affect Public
Disapproval?" (1984) 24 Brit. J. Criminology 27. The Canadian Sentencing Commission
Report, pp. 386-387 proposes a system for equating fines and time served in default.
149. For a discussion of the constitutional nature of the right to individualized justice see
Bruce P. Archibald, "Crime and Punishment: The Constitutional Requirements for Sentencing
Reform in Canada" supra, footnote 93.
150. For a standard list of the factors affecting sentencing, see Ruby, Sentencing, supra,
footnote 20, pp. 139-192. Of course, a thorough-going application of the principles of
proportionality and equality might make consideration of some of these factors inappropriate.
See Archibald, supra, footnote 149.
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that those whose decisions will be implemented in accordance with it will
have confidence in the system's fairness. 151
The importance of these nascent conversion tables for coping with
problems of racial discrimination in the justice system is that they allow
for tailoring various utilitarian strategies of rehabilitation, crime
reduction, and perhaps even affirmative action, while maintaining a
precise understanding of how these actions would impact on notions of
just desert. They permit multiple approaches to the purposes of the
criminal sanction, while not sacrificing the sentencing principles of
proportionality, equality and restraint. An attempt to elaborate on these
ideas follows.
IV. Equality and Affirmative Action in the Choice Among Sentencing
Options
It is the intent of this section of the paper to examine the two objectives
mentioned earlier, that is, egalitarian sentencing and ameliorative
sentencing. In other words, how can racial bias or perceptions of racial
bias in sentencing be eliminated, and how can systemic discrimination be
reduced, while maintaining adherence to the principles of sentencing just
discussed? To do this, approaches to sentencing members of visible
minority groups will be analyzed firstly on the assumption of formal
equality, and secondly on assumptions of social and economic inequality
calling for affirmative action. It may be useful to point out at this juncture
that systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system can also be
addressed to some extent through prosecution policy. That is, problems
may be ameliorated through diversion programmes or measures designed
to respond to systemic discrimination by withholding or terminating
prosecutions in this public interest as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
The elaboration of principles by which to structure public interest factors
in prosecution policy for this purpose is beyond the scope of this paper.
52
This discussion is limited to the stage of the prosecution which follows a
finding of guilty - egalitarian and ameliorative sentencing.
1. Sentencing Visible Minority Accuseds on Assumptions of Formal
LegalEquality
(i) Colour Blind Sentencing Principles
To sentence a member of a visible minority on assumptions of formal
151. The Canadian Sentencing Commission Report, pp. 435-456 would solve this problem
through judicial involvement in a permanent sentencing commission. Interim measures on a
provincial basis however, are possible and some are suggested below under the heading
"Allocating Responsibility...".
152. These matters are discussed in Bruce P. Archibald, Prosecuting Officers and the
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legal equality is to assume that racial discrimination is not causally
connected in any way to the accused's criminal behavior. In other words,
the accused's race is irrelevant to the principles of sentencing, in so far as
determining the severity of the sanction is concerned. Normal principles
of proportionality in relation to the gravity of the offence and the degree
of culpability of the offender are in play, and the accused is given a
sanction equivalent to any other offender for similar offences committed
in similar circumstances. In the absence of proof that race was causally
related to the crime (such as perhaps a racial insult provoking an assault),
or in the absence of a policy of affirmative action sentencing to be
discussed below, sentencing on the assumption of formal equality in
accordance with general principles ought to be the norm.
(ii) Racially Sensitive Purposes and Options
While visible minority status is irrelevant for determining sentence
severity on assumptions of formal legal equality, it may be quite relevant
for choosing an appropriate sentencing option among a range of those of
equivalent severity. Where there are fears that there may be racial bias in
sentencing, and where the legal system through applying laws "neutral on
their face" may be perpetuating existing social and economic inequality,
adopting utilitarian sentencing strategies which are sensitive to racial and
cultural differences will increasingly be seen as a measure of the adequacy
of the criminal justice system in a multi-cultural and multi-racial
society.153 This can be done without fear of a white majoritarian backlash
against "special treatment" if a table of equivalences is available. 54
In concrete terms this strategy stresses the value of community
sanctions as a primary strategy for the criminal justice system in general,
and recognizes the necessity for community sanctioning options tailored
to minority needs in particular. Community service orders can be
arranged so as to involve work for black or aboriginal communities or
charitable organizations which have their roots in these communities.
Fine option programmes will, of course, have to be structured along
similar lines. Probation orders involving conditions other than
Administration of Justice in Nova Scotia, a forthcoming study conducted for the Royal
Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution in Nova Scotia, the Report of which is
expected in late 1989.
153. Many of the sentencing alternatives which have been experimented with in western
Canada have their origins in concerns as to how the justice system can more adequately
respond to the needs of aboriginal offenders and aboriginal communities. See the works by
Ekstedt and Jackson, supra, footnote 116,passim.
154. Recent news reports of racially rooted disturbances at a high school in Cole Harbour,
Halifax County, Nova Scotia indicate that some sectors of the public thought Black
"instigators" were getting special treatment.
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community service can take into account the offender's particular needs
as derived from his or her status as a member of a visible minority group
- particular counselling services with expertise in relating black and
minority problems would be particularly apposite.
Victim/offender reconciliation programmes may pose special
opportunities for dealing with racial discrimination. Where victim and
offender are from the same aboriginal community, for example, village
elders might be recognized as appropriate mediators in a victim/offender
reconciliation programme. A sensitive mediator particularly skilled in
victim/offender reconciliation might effect particularly helpful results in
inter-racial and inter-cultural understanding as between victims and
offenders of differing ethnic groups. On the other hand, a botched
attempt at victim/offender reconciliation in this context might have
particularly damaging results for race relations.1
55
How the system can move toward these racially sensitive sentencing
options will be discussed below. But it is clear that adopting rehabilitative
purposes for criminal sanctions, with a content which takes into account
the needs and resources of visible minority communities and their
individual members, can be one without necessarily abandoning
principles of formal legal equality. Proportionality, equality and restraint
can predominate in sentencing while using sentencing options designed to
alleviate systemic discrimination in society, particularly in a system
making use of community sentencing options with an accepted set of
standardized equivalent sanctions. Of course racially sensitive
programming can and ought to be adopted within the correctional system
as well. However, when the gravity of the offence or the needs of
particular deterrence or incapacitation dictate a term of imprisonment,
the sentencing judge loses capacity to control and individualize
sentencing purposes when he or she commits the offender to the care of
correctional officials. The use of correctional programming in the struggle
against systemic discrimination would be the subject of another paper.
2. Sentencing Visible Minority Accuseds on Affirmative Action
Assumptions
Affirmative action involves special treatment to alleviate the problems of
groups disadvantaged because of previous adverse treatment or limiting
circumstances. 156 Charter section 15(2) provides that the equal protection
provision of the constitution:
155. Human Rights Commissions may have valuable expertise to impart to criminal justice
professionals in this regard.
156. For a brief treatment see Dale Gibson, "Canadian Equality Jurisprudence: Year One" in
Sheilah L. Martin and Kathleen E. Mahoney, Equality and Judicial Neutraliy, Carswell,
Calgary, 1987, at pp. 142-143.
406 The Dalhousie Law Journal
".... does not preclude any law program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
Thus Canadian legislators and policy makers are more sheltered than
their American counterparts in protecting affirmative action programmes
from charges that they are constitutionally prohibited "reverse
discrimination." 157 At issue in most of the American jurisprudence is
whether visible minorities can be given preferential access to certain
privileges or advantages not whether such minorities can be sheltered
from general penalties which might otherwise fall upon them with
unequal incidence.'5 At issue in this section is the question whether
Canadian sentencing policy can proceed from an affirmative action
foundation.
(i) Social Responsibility for Crime Causation
Individualistic assumptions about crime causation and personal
responsibility for intentional, or at least fault-based, behavior are in
seeming contradiction with the use of affirmative action principles in
sentencing. 59 If a resident of Canada has committed an offence, ought
not that person to be sentenced according to the gravity of the offence
and the degree of his or her culpability like any one else regardless of race
or colour? But it is in the phrase the "degree of culpability of the
offender" that is found the key to reconciling affirmative action with the
principles of just deserts. Any decision to treat certain visible minorities
differently in the sentencing process must be based on the idea that
society at large shares in the responsibility for the systemic discrimination
which is evidenced in the criminal justice system by such factors as
disproportionate incarceration rates. 60 From this premise follows the
corollary that it is fair to alleviate the severity of a criminal sanction to be
imposed upon a member of a visible minority group if it can be said that
general social responsibility for his or her community's disadvantaged
state reduces his or her degree of culpability for the offence.
157. See J. Ely, "The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination" (1974), 41 U. of Chicago
L. Rev. 723. For a rosy interpretation of U.S. affirmative action jurisprudence see Lawrence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd Ed.), Foundation Press, Mineola, 1988, pp. 1521-
1544.
158. See Tribe, ibid
159. As was mentioned earlier, Canadian sentencing law is, at first blush, "colour blind". Texts
do not mention the topic, see texts in footnote 20, supra.
160. This notion of social responsibility for certain aspects of crime causation has been
recognized to some degree in Scandinavian criminal justice systems. For a Canadian discussion
see "A Social Responsibility Approach to Criminal Justice, National Associations Active in
Criminal Justice, Ottawa, 1988.
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(ii) Affirmative Action Sentencing Programmes
Were individual judges to make such affirmative action decisions
according to their own personal standards of whether a particular
accused was led to crime by virtue of cultural, social or economic
circumstances linked to racial discrimination, charges of reverse
discrimination would probably arise from the sentencing disparity that
such a situation would likely engender. Such an approach might be
unconstitutional in any event. Charter section 15(2) only allows such
action as a part of a "law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups." If an
alternative sentencing option programme were devised for, say,
aboriginal offenders with a view to improving the lot of the offender as
well as the aboriginal community as a whole, such a programme would
appear to fall within the ambit of section 15(2). It would be
constitutional even though it might be thought a less onerous form of
criminal sanction, and therefore contrary to principles of proportionality,
equality and restraint if these are to be viewed from an individualistic
perspective. An individual judge's decision to merely "go easy" on a
particular aboriginal offender might not withstand such scrutiny.'
6'
Quite properly it would seem that an affirmative action sentencing
programme is a matter for politicians and policy makers rather than for
judicial initiative. Weighing the proper circumstances for the recognition
of social responsibility for crime causation and not merely individual
culpability is a politically sensitive issue. Charter section 15(2), in
speaking of a "law program or activity" of an affirmative action type
would seem to require a coherent and structured strategy rather than a
mere accretion of individual sentencing decisions with such a goal. Early
constitutional litigation over section 15(2) indicates that a mere
declaration of legislative purpose that a programme has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantages individuals or groups may
not be sufficient to enable it to qualify for the affirmative action exception
to general requirements of formal legal equality. 62 It has been held that
161. For conflicting judicial approaches to this issue see R v. Firemain (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d)
82 (Ont. C.A.) and R v. Naqitarvik (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (N.W.T.C.A.).
162. See Apsit v. Manitoba Human Rights Commission (1987) 7 A.C.W.S. (3d) 179 (Man.
Q.B., Simonsen, J.) where a plan giving preferred rights to native people in the production and
harvesting of wild rice was held not to meet the requirements of Charter section 15(2)
notwithstanding its approval as an affirmative action programme by the Manitoba Human
Rights Commission. Note, however, that this was the confiring of a privilege upon the
disadvantages group and not the withholding of a penalty. The decision was overturned on
procedural grounds only. See Manitoba Rice Farmers Association v. Human Rights
Commission (Man.) (1988) 55 Man. R. (2d) 263 (Man. CA.) See also Harrison v. U.BC.;
Connell v. B.C., [1988] 2 W.W.R. 688 (B.C.C.A.).
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the form of ameliorative action must be rationally related to the cause of
the disadvantage. 163
In order for an affirmative action sentencing programme to validly
operate, one might have to demonstrate not only that the visible minority
group in question had historically suffered disadvantages, but that these
disadvantages are causally related to crime of certain types and that the
sentencing options envisaged by the programme will strike at the roots of
this causational problem. Meeting these stringent criteria would not be
easy given the present state of understanding of crime causation. 164
However, it is possible to think of a pertinent example. It seems relatively
clear that high rates of certain types of crime among aboriginal peoples
are causally related to the destruction of aboriginal economic, social and
cultural patterns through federal government policies in relation to the
creation and management of reserves established pursuant to the Indian
Act, as well as provincial policies limiting aboriginal hunting and
fishing.165 It may be that a separate aboriginal justice system involving the
restoration of aboriginal patterns of social control and social
reconciliation could be upheld under Charter section 15(2) regardless of
progress, or lack thereof, with respect to the recognition and enforcement
of aboriginal rights under Charter section 25.
A more limited version of such a programme might involve continued
jurisdiction of general criminal courts with special sentencing options,
which might be less severe than the table of equivalencies would
normally demand, for aboriginal offenders involved with certain crimes
under particular circumstances. The sine qua non of such sentencing
options, would seem to be that they would effectively assist aboriginal
offenders in overcoming the disadvantages resulting from systemic
discrimination. Until such programmes develop a track record for
reducing recidivism rates, this latter requirement might have to be
accepted as an article of faith. However, if the rational connection can be
demonstrated between the programme and the cause of the disadvan-
taged under Charter section 15(2) they would pass constitutional muster.
V. Allocating Responsibility for Alleviating through Sentencing
Systemic Discrimination and Perceptions of Racial Bias
While the foregoing analysis is optimistic in tone, one must be quite clear
163. Apsit v. Manitoba Human Rights Commission ibid, per Simonsen, J.
164. See Void and Bernard, Theoretical Criminology, supra, footnote 63.
165. See the Report of the Canadian Bar Association. Aboriginal Rights in Canada- An
Agenda for Actio4 Ottawa, 1988 for a general discussion of the situation of native
communities from a legal perspective. More importantly see Michall Jackson, Locking Up
Natives in Canada, A Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment
and Release, 1988.
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about the limitations of sentencing as a means for alleviating problems of
systemic discrimination. As was described in Part I, over representation
of visible minorities as accused persons or prisoners is not caused simply
by sentencing judges. The social, economic and cultural conditions in a
society characterized by systemic discrimination which disadvantage
visible minority groups cannot be overcome by judges or sentencing
alone. Yet all those involved in the sentencing bear a responsibility to
bring about the kind of improvements in the criminal justice system
which are discussed here. In the final analysis, however, the judiciary
bears a special responsibility since judges are at the symbolic focal point
of the sentencing process. This concluding section will suggest a tentative
allocation of responsibilities for change, and make some comment on the
particularly difficult situation of the judiciary.
1. Allocating Responsibilityfor Change
The most far reaching and comprehensive solutions to the problems
discussed here would come from a permanent sentencing commission
with authority to issue guidelines on sentencing issues, do research on the
empirical effects of alterations in sentencing policy, and adjust guidelines
to reflect improvements in sentencing knowledge and the practical
experience of courts and correctional personnel. That luxury is not
available, but the problems of systemic discrimination exist and
successful constitutional challenges to vulnerable aspects of the criminal
justice system are forcing us to take immediate remedial action. Policy
makers, crown prosecutors, defence counsel, judges, correctional
personnel, legal researchers, and most importantly, leaders of visible
minority communities, all have a role to play in this process. Egalitarian
and ameliorative sentence developments will come through co-operative
effort among all those involved in the criminal justice system.
Policy makers in the Attorney General's Departments and the
Solicitor-General's Departments must create a joint task force to flesh out
the presently existing skeletal framework of community sentencing
options and equivalences among those options. A conversion table
allowing for the evaluation of the relative severity of alternative
dispositions is within grasp. Moreover, this can be done without in any
way adversely affecting the judicial role in providing individual justice in
particular cases. Both departments must be involved so that "crime and
punishment" are not artificially separated by different responsibilities for
prosecution policy and correctional policy. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General's department and in particular those responsible for
community corrections will bear the brunt of identifying and working
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with appropriate representatives of visible minority communities to
elaborate the details of community sentencing options.
Leaders and organizations within the visible minority communities
have the responsibility to press the advantages which are apparent in the
present climate of change within the criminal justice system. Rhetorical
criticism, satisfying though it may sometimes be, must be abandoned in
favour of the elaboration of pragmatic, economical proposals for
community sentencing options. These options must be grounded in sound
correctional principles and be supported by community organizations
committed to assisting in their implementation. Community service
placements, victim/offender reconciliation programmes and resources for
specialized probation supervision must be among the options considered.
The privatization of some correctional services is being actively
considered in many quarters, and those capable of influencing events in
visible minority communities ought not to miss this window of
opportunity.
Once the groundwork has been laid at the policy level and within the
community, those closest to the sentencing process - crown prosecutors,
defence counsel and judges - have a responsibility to make egalitarian
and ameliorative sentencing alternatives available to appropriate
offenders. These players can be assisted in this task by well directed
professional education programmes involving participation from policy
makers and visible minority community representatives. The annfial
seminars of crown prosecutors and provincial court judges must make
room on their agendas for the topic of implementation strategy for special
sentencing measures for certain offenders who are members of visible
minority groups. The Barristers Society or the Criminal Law Subsection
of the Canadian Bar Association will have opportunities to contribute to
this process through their continuing legal education programmes and
meetings.
Finally, it is important that legal researchers and social scientists be
involved from the outset in the elaboration of sentencing projects and
their evaluation. Correctional literature is replete with examples of
programmes which, while based on good ideas, have been inadequately
executed or not evaluated so that the benefits or drawbacks were either
not explored or not fully analyzed for the edification of subsequent
generations. The resources of the universities, and in particular those of
the institutes of criminology ought not to be ignored.
It is only through such a multifaceted strategy that the causes of
systemic discrimination can in any way be alleviated through the
sentencing process. However, by outlining these inter-connecting roles
and responsibilities, the difficulties ought not to be exaggerated. A few
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key individuals with the will to bring about change, and with the proper
institutional resources and community connections, could accomplish a
great deal. Setting attainable goals, perhaps through pilot projects in the
early stages, may be the only realistic way to assure success in the long
run.
2. The Symbolic Importance of the Judiciary
The co-operative process described above for implementation of
egalitarian and ameliorative sentencing strategies regarding disadvan-
taged visible minorities could have an impact on systemic discrimination.
But the judiciary is still the focus for the perceptions of racial bias in the
criminal justice system. There may be nothing that can be done to
prevent people from drawing the erroneous conclusion that because there
are more visible minority offenders sentenced or imprisoned that
sentencing judges are racial prejudiced as a group. Nevertheless, judges,
as most well know, must be constantly vigilant to see that inadvertent
remarks or insensitive bureaucratic practices do not lead to misinterpre-
tations. Anecdotal isolated incidents of racial discrimination, or rude or
insensitive treatment of even a few minority offenders can cause
extraordinary damage to the reputation of the criminal justice system. A
routine part of orientation training or continuing judicial education
seminars might usefully be the introduction of judges to visible minority
cultures and minority perceptions of the criminal justice system. The
resulting sensitivity might reduce the judicial faux pas which are at the
root of some perceptions of racial bias in the courtroom.
Finally efforts must be made to ensure that our court houses are
reflections of the preservation and enhancement of the multi-cultural
heritage Canadian society which is guaranteed by section 27 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The effect of the impression that court
rooms and court houses are white majoritarian institutions cannot be
over-estimated. Greater representation of visible minorities individuals as
judges, court reporters, and court administrators can have a visible effect
on changing the ambience of judicial institutions. Moreover, this not
merely a matter of appearances. Prejudiced individuals who may be
working in the system will be much more circumspect about airing
unacceptable racist views when in the presence of colleagues and co-
workers from disadvantaged visible minority groups.
Egalitarian and ameliorative sentencing policies and programmes may
help to alleviate some of the causes and effects of systemic discrimination
in the criminal justice system. But judges still occupy the symbolic focal
point for demonstrating that justice is seen to be done for visible
minorities in Canadian society.
